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Abstract
Aim. This research paper is to highlight the freedom of the judges who represent 
one of the three branches of governments, which is still lacking in both the developing 
and developed countries. Their freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom 
of making decisions can be de? ned as the independence of the judiciary.
Methods. The research method used in this paper is the case study approach by 
learning the historical background of Hungary with the connection of the EU’s legal 
standards that can support work to do analysis both theoretically and practically.
Results and Conclusion. The results of the work can be applied in some countries 
that are not linked to each other with regional integration policy (like Myanmar and 
ASEAN Countries) and the functions of the Constitutional Courts need to be updated 
to protect the fundamental or basic rights effectively at a national level and to be free 
from the in? uence of the legislature and the executive.
Cognitive value. The value of the paper is to learn the best solutions for reconcilia-
tion between the three branches of government, especially to respect the independence 
of the judiciary and the principle of irremovability of judges widely accepted in not only 
international standards but also EU norms.
Key words: judicial independence, irremovability of judges, legal norm of Euro-
pean Union, Constitutional Court
Introduction
Hungary was a socialist state before 1989 and after that it became a democracy.The Constitutional Court was established on 19 October 1989. It was a sign 
of attempting to promote democracy and human rights through the judiciary. 
One year later, the death penalty was abolished on 24 October (The Constitu-
tional Court of Hungary, 1990). It shows that Hungary respects human rights 
because the right to life (Article 3) is the most fundamental right under the UN 
Charter (United Nations, 1948). Then, Hungary signed the European Convention 
on Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR) on 6 November 1990 and in 2004 Hungary 
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became a member of EU. In fact, a state in Europe that wants to join with the EU 
should ful? l the formal requirements such as free market, stable democracy, rule 
of law and follow the EU legislation (E uropean Commission, 2016).
Thus, Hungary proved that the state respects democracy by setting up the 
Constitutional Court in 1989, abolishing the death penalty and signing the ECHR 
in 1990. These are the efforts that Hungary made to change from the socialist 
system into democracy. It can be said that judicial independence existed with the 
rule of law consistent with the legal standards of the EU’s framework.
European Court of Justice (ecj)
 The European Court of Justice (hereinafter: ECJ) is composed of one judge 
from each EU country and eleven Advocate Generals. It is also be known as 
Chief Justice of the European Union (CJEU).
The main duty of the ECJ is to interpret EU law. There are two sources of 
EU law: primary law that is included the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and 
the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the secondary 
source of recommendations, opinions, decisions, regulations and directives. 
Some of the researchers de? ne supplementary law as the third source of EU 
law (European Commission). If a case before the Constitutional Court is rela-
ted to the EU values, a Member State shall transfer that case to the ECJ for a 
preliminary ruling (Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union, 2008). The Union is founded on the values of respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights (A rticle 2, Treaty on European Union).
 Reform 2011 in Hungary
Two different high courts were established under the Constitution 2011 in 
Hungary, which replaced the Constitution 1949. It entered into force on 1 Janu-
ary 2012. The Constitutional Court is the highest court to protect the Constitu-
tion (Hungary’s Constitution of 2011, 2019). The former Supreme Court was 
replaced with the Curia (the historical name) and it is the highest judicial body 
(Hungary’s Constitution of 2011, 2019).
Important functions of the Constitutional Court
Competencies of Constitutional Courts are different in general. The main 
aims are to promote democracy and to protect the fundamental rights vested 
under the Constitution. The Constitutional Court of Hungary has the impor-
tant functions of:
– Ex Ante Review (Preliminary Norm Control)
– Ex Post Review (Posterior Norm Control)
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– Judicial Initiative for Norm Control in Concrete Cases
– Constitutional Complaint (Detre, 2019).
These functions are the powers of the Court to protect the fundamental 
rights effective theoretically. In Myanmar, the Constitutional Tribunal has not 
vested these kinds of functions even in theory, therefore, the Court had faced a 
hard time in practice and then the ? rst nine judges of the Constitutional Tribu-
nal were impeached by the legislature and they resigned themselves.
Constitutional complaint
The function of the constitutional complaint is important for the citizen who 
has been affected by a concrete case or by the application of a legal provision 
contrary to the Fundamental Law and may submit a constitutional complaint 
to the Constitutional Court (Hungary’s Constitution of 2011, 2019).
The const itutional complaint is a new type of complaint, introduced instead of 
the actio popularis. In a justi? ed complaint procedure, the Constitutional Court has 
the competence to annul the challenged legal norms which are not in harmony 
with the Constitutional law and break the petitioner’s fundamental rights. The real 
or genuine constitutional complaint enables the Court to provide a constitutional 
remedy against judicial decisions (Detre, 2019). According to some constitutional 
law researchers from Hungary, ,,the main function of the Constitutional Court 
is supplemented by a function serving a more direct protection of fundamental 
rights in the form of the real constitutional complaint procedure in some European 
countries like Germany, the Czech Republic, Croatia and Slovenia” (Somody, 
Vissy, 2011, p. 96). The Fundamental Law abolished the so-called actio popularis 
and introduced a more complex system of review, in which the emphasis is on the 
individual concerns, i.e. the system of constitutional complaints (Szalbot, 2019).
Case studies
The Commissioner for fundamental rights submitted to the Constitutional 
Court request for a review of the whole of the Transitional Provisions of the 
Fundamental Law of Hungary (hereinafter: TPFL) with regard to being con-
trary to the Fundamental Law and asked for the annulment of it under section 
24 (2), Act CLI of Constitutional Court (2011).
There were some effects of the new fundamental law that came into force on 
1 January 2012 in Hungary. As the Transitional Provisions to the Fundamental 
Law 2011 entered into fore on the same day. According to Article 11 of the law, 
the legal successor of the Supreme Court, the National Council of Justice and its 
President shall be the Curia for the administraton of Justice and the mandate of 
the President of the Supreme Court and the President and members of the Natio-
nal Council of Justice shall be terminated when the Fundamental Law come into 
force (The Transitional Provision to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, 2012). 
Under Article 26 (2) of the Fundamental Law, with the exception of the Presi-
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dent of the Curia, no judge may serve who is older than the general retirement 
age (The Transitional Provision to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, 2012). The 
same rules were applicable to 236 judges, 100 prosecutors and 60 notaries who 
had to retire in 2012 (Vincze, 2014). This manner of removing judges and legal 
of? cers made judicial independence fade away under the discrimination of age 
and violation of the EU directive. The Venice Commission examined that this 
issue not from the age discrimination but its effect on judicial independence (the 
Opinion no 665/2012, 2012 by the Venice Commission).
The Vice President of the Supreme Court submitted a constitutional com-
plaint to the Constitutional Court (2011), claiming that the termination of his 
position violated the rule of law the prohibition of retroactive legislation and 
his right to a remedy (45/2012, XII.29).
The Constitutional Court rejected this complaint by justifying the reason for 
reorganisation of the judicial system and the important changes in the tasks and 
competencies of the President of the Curia. In fact, the competencies of the Presi-
dent of the Curia had already been promoted. Attila Vincze also concluded in this 
way that the premature termination of the claimant’s term of of? ce weakened the 
guarantees for the separation of powers, and was contrary to the prohibition of 
retroactive law-making and breached the principle of rule of law and the right to 
a remedy” (Hungary: Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court, 2011, p. 206).
The European Commission alleged that Hungary had forced the retirement 
of the judges made in a binding EU legislation known as the anti-discrimi-
nation directive (Directive 78/2000/EU) violated (Directive 78/2000/EU). 
The Commission hence ? led the case before the ECJ (European Commission 
v Hungary C-286/12). In fact, Hungary had the obligation to submit the case 
to the ECJ as a preliminary question due to Article 267 of TFEU (Vincze, 2014).
The EU accepts a country that values democracy and human rights as a 
member of the EU. After becoming a member of the EU, that country should 
obey the values of the EU prescribed in the EU treaties. Otherwise, the EU has 
the power to sanction and ? ne that country because of the failure to follow the 
uniformity of EU countries (Council of the European Union, 2018).
Irremovability of judges; 
EU standard of judicial independence
The ECJ decided that Hungary violated the EU law, but the removed judges 
could not get back their former positions. It could be criticised that there were 
no effective remedies under politic if public servants who had had their funda-
mental rights violated, even though those rights are values of EU. The principle 
of irremovability of judges under the European standards on the independence 
of the judiciary and rule of law notes as follows: “Judges, whether appointed or 
elected, shall have tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of the 
term of of? ce” (Vincze, 2014, p. 206). Regarding this principle of irremovability 
of judges, Andras Baka, whose right to a hearing was rejected before the national 
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Constitutional Court, submitted a suit against Hungary to the European Court 
of Human Rights (hereinafter; ECtHR) in 2012. He was the former President of 
the Supreme Court of Hungary and was forced into retirement when the Consti-
tution 2011 came into force in 2012, under which the general retirement age had 
been changed immediately from 70 to 62 years. In addition, ? ve-year experience 
became necessary to be a judge of the Curia due to the term of the Act CLXII of 
2011 (2013) on the Legal Status and the Remuneration of Judges. This term was 
intentionally prohibited for Baka not to be a judge of Curia again by showing the 
reason of reorganising the judicial system in Hungary. In fact, Baka was a judge 
of ECtHR from 1991 to 2008 and then he was elected for six-year term by the 
Hungarian Parliament as a President of Supreme Court in 2009. Thus, he could 
be a judge until 2015. Unfortunately, the restriction of at least ? ve-year expe-
rience of being a judge in Hungary was essential to be a judge. He criticised the 
actions of government related to the judicial reform as an experienced judge. The 
most important point was that he had no right to hear the case before the Consti-
tutional Court and when he made the complaint to the Court, the Court rejected 
his complaint by the reason of reforming the judiciary. The alteration of the court 
system is one of the three exceptions to the principle of irremovability recognised 
by the Council of Europe. However, the reason given by Hungary under this 
exception was not acceptable due to the Baka case. Therefore, in 2016, the ECtHR 
found that Hungary violated freedom of speech (Article 6 (1) of ECHR) and fair 
trial right (Article 10 of ECHR) of the ECHR and European standard on the inde-
pendence of judiciary and rule of law (Cannoot, 2016).
The principle of irremovability of judges came as a result of this kind of the 
removal of judges which had been made by the impeachment of the legislature 
and also by orders of the executive. Since former times, removal of judges from 
Supreme Courts was popular for the executive and the legislature if the deci-
sions of the Courts ran contrary to their wishes.
Conclusion
The competencies of the Constitutional Court have been updated in Hungary 
and it is also a member of EU. So, the Court’s power is also wider than before and 
the citizens of Hungary have the opportunities of enjoying not only the national 
fundamental rights but also the EU citizens’ rights. The functions of the national 
Constitutional Court need to be stable and free from the in? uence of political 
affairs. If we consider the functions of the Constitutional Court in Hungary, one 
of the important functions of the Court has been abolished and the constitutional 
complaint was inserted instead of it due to the Constitution 2011. Even though 
actio popularis was famous for the protection of the fundamental rights before, 
this kind of constitutional complaint could not do so after the Constitution 2011 
coming into force (Baka v Hungary, no. 20261/12). EU accepts a country that 
values democracy and human rights based on the rule of law as a member of the 
EU. After becoming a member of the EU, that country should obey the values of 
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the EU prescribed in the EU treaties. Otherwise, the EU has the power to sanction 
and ? ne that country because of failures in following EU law harmony with the 
EU countries (Townley, 2019). The reasons why most of the European countries 
establish separate Constitutional Courts is that they are essential to keep demo-
cracy, to protect human rights and to implement the image of rule of law for both 
the governments and the governed. Therefore, the independence of the judiciary 
is also important to be guaranteed by the government and the duty to protect it is 
the responsibility of Constitutional Courts or Supreme Courts in some countries.
Finally, even though the politics have been changed, the principle of judi-
cial independence and the irremovability of judges should not be violated in a 
democratic state and under the regional integration.
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